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Models and constructs of individual differences are numerous and diverse.
But detecting commonalities, differences and interrelations is hindered by
the common abstract terms (e.g. ‘personality’, ‘temperament’, ‘traits’) that
do not reveal the particular phenomena denoted. This article applies a trans-
disciplinary paradigm for research on individuals that builds on complexity
theory and epistemological complementarity. Its philosophical, metatheo-
retical and methodological frameworks provide concepts to differentiate
various kinds of phenomena (e.g. physiology, behaviour, psyche, language).
They are used to scrutinize the field’s basic concepts and to elaborate meth-
odological foundations for taxonomizing individual variations in humans
and other species. This guide to developing comprehensive and representa-
tive models explores the decisions taxonomists must make about which
individual variations to include, which to retain and how to model them.
Selection and reduction approaches from various disciplines are classified
by their underlying rationales, pinpointing possibilities and limitations.
Analyses highlight that individuals’ complexity cannot be captured by one
universal model. Instead, multiple models phenotypically taxonomizing
different kinds of variability in different kinds of phenomena are needed
to explore their causal and functional interrelations and ontogenetic
development that are then modelled in integrative and explanatory taxo-
nomies. This research agenda requires the expertise of many disciplines
and is inherently transdisciplinary.
This article is part of the theme issue ‘Diverse perspectives on diversity:
multi-disciplinary approaches to taxonomies of individual differences’.1. Taxonomic models of individual differences:
importance and challenges
Individual differences in a species’ psycho-bio-socio-ecological systems reveal
important insights into these systems’ functions, causes, development and evol-
ution. Taxonomizing this diversity is a fundamental task; it provides reference
models for many fields of research and applied settings. But it is challenging.
Where to begin? What to focus on? Countless models were developed, each
focusing on particular phenomena, categorizations and interpretations. This
heterogeneity hinders exchange and integration to advance our understanding
of individuals.
Diversity among models also reflect differences in basic terms and concepts.
More than 50 ‘personality’ definitions exist [1]. Controversies revolve around
distinguishing personality as socio-cultural concept from ‘temperament’ as bio-
logically based concept [2]. Trait concepts are particularly diverse. A ‘trait’ may
denote an abstract concept describing stable individual differences or a single
measurement datum; a population’s dimension of individual differences or
an individual’s score on such a dimension; a summary description of observa-
ble individual differences or an internal psychobiological entity influencing
individuals’ thoughts, feelings and behaviours [3,4]. Different conceptual
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nomies that may therefore reflect different phenomena,
rendering models incomparable and hindering integration.
This article explores these issues from a philosophy-of-
science perspective by applying a transdisciplinary paradigm
for research on individuals that provides frameworks for
conceptual integration across disciplines. These frameworks
and relevant concepts are first briefly introduced and used
to scrutinize central terms and concepts of individual differ-
ences research (§2). Then, they are applied to explore the
methodological foundations of taxonomy development, illus-
trated with examples from various fields (§3). The article
concludes with implications for future research (§4). rans.R.Soc.B
373:201701712. Transdisciplinary philosophy-of-science
paradigm for research on individuals
(TPS-Paradigm)
The TPS-Paradigm comprises interrelated philosophical,
metatheoretical and methodological frameworks that coher-
ently build upon each other (therefore called paradigm). In
these frameworks, basic assumptions, concepts, approaches
and methods from various disciplines are systematically inte-
grated, further developed and complemented by novel ones,
thereby creating unitary frameworks that transcend disciplin-
ary boundaries. Its philosophy-of-science focus reflects the
aim of making explicit basic assumptions, metatheories and
methodologies underlying given scientific systems to help
scientists scrutinize and further develop their established
theories, models and practices [5–11].
(a) Complexity theories and epistemological
complementarity
The philosophical framework specifies presuppositions made
about the nature and properties of individuals and the funda-
mental notions bywhich knowledge about them can be gained.
First, the TPS-Paradigm builds on complexity theories to
consider that individuals are living organisms that can be
conceived as nested systems at different levels of organiz-
ation, from cells over single individuals up to societies. At
each level, living organisms function as integrated wholes
in which dynamic non-linear processes occur from which
new properties emerge that could not have been predicted
from knowledge simply of their constituents and that can
feed back to the constituents from which they emerge.
Dynamic multilevel transactions create complex patterns of
upward and downward causation, which are incompatible
with deterministic and reductionistic assumptions [12–14].
Second, the TPS-Paradigm builds on the principle of
epistemological complementarity originally introduced to
quantum physics as a resolution to the wave-particle dilemma
in research on the nature of light [15]. It highlights that different
methods can reveal information about properties of an object of
research that are maximally incompatible with one another
but both essential for an exhaustive understanding of it, and
that may therefore be regarded as complementary to one
another. This implies that studies should not be limited to just
one method. Instead, methods should be adapted to the
particular properties of the phenomena under study. The
TPS-Paradigm applies this principle in several ways, such asto the body–mind problem [16], to elaborate criteria for
appropriate phenomenon-methodology matching [5] and to
resolve the idiographic-nomothetic controversy in research on
individuals (§3).
Complexity theory and epistemological complementarity
lay important conceptual foundations for taxonomizing indi-
vidual variations in different kinds of phenomena studied
in individuals.(b) Differentiating various kinds of phenomena studied
in individuals
A third presupposition of the TPS-Paradigm is that all science
is done by humans, and thus limited by human perceptual
and cognitive abilities. A phenomenon is therefore defined as
anything that humans can perceive or can (technically) make
perceptible or that humans can conceive1. A phenomenon’s
occurrence is called an event or element.(i) Three metatheoretical properties
The paradigm’s metatheoretical framework builds on three
abstract properties that determine a phenomenon’s perceptibil-
ity by humans and that are therefore scaled to human everyday
experiences. These are a phenomenon’s (1) location in relation
to the intact body of the individual studied (e.g. internal, external),
its (2) temporal extension (e.g. transient, long-lasting) and (3)
spatial extension conceived complementarily as material and
immaterial physical (spatially extended) versus ‘non-physical’
(without spatial properties). These properties, because they
determine a phenomenon’s perceptibility under everyday con-
ditions, also determine the methods required to make it
accessible under research conditions (elaborated in the meth-
odological framework). Their particular constellation in any
given phenomenon is used to metatheoretically differentiate
and define various kinds of phenomena studied in individuals
(e.g. behaviours, psyche). These differentiations are made only
on the conceptual level; the phenomena themselves cannot be
separated from another in any living individual (e.g. physi-
ology and morphology). Moreover, the definitions denote
the phenomena as such without also incorporating their
explanation [5–7,10].(ii) Basic kinds of phenomena
Four kinds of phenomena—morphology, physiology, behav-
iour and psyche—are considered as basic because they are
inseparable in the individual.
Morphology denotes living organisms’ bodily structures
and their constituent parts; morphological phenomena are
located internal and/or external, temporally extended and
material physical (e.g. brain). Physiology denotes morpho-
logical phenomena’s physical and chemical functioning.
Physiological phenomena occur primarily internally (e.g. neu-
rotransmitter activity), are immaterial physical (e.g. heat) and
often momentary (e.g. heart beats), but some are temporally
more extended (e.g. blood pH).
Behaviours are defined as ‘external changes or activities of
living organisms that are functionally mediated by other exter-
nal phenomena in the present moment’ [10]. Thus, behavioural
phenomena are entirely external (publicly accessible), physical
(mostly immaterial; e.g. movements, radiation) and momen-
tary (transient). As their spatio-temporal extensions vary,
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between behaviour and the psyche.2
Psyche is defined as the ‘entirety of the phenomena of
the immediate experiential reality, both conscious and non-
conscious, of living organisms’ [5] (with immediate indicating
absence of phenomena mediating their perception). Psychical3
phenomena (e.g. cognitions, emotions, volitions) are conceived
as occurring entirely internal. This differentiates them from
their possible expression in behaviour and language (§2biii)
from which psychical phenomena can be inferred only
indirectly. Psychical phenomena’s immaterial properties show
neither spatial properties in themselves nor systematic relations
to the spatial properties of the physical phenomena to which
they are bound (e.g. brain matter and physiology) and are
therefore conceived as ‘non-physical’, reflecting complemen-
tary body–mind relations [16]. Psychical phenomena are
perceptible only by each individual itself and only in the here-
and-now, in individuals’ experiencings (Erleben; e.g. thinking,
feeling). But despite this transient access, some psychical
phenomena are temporally more extended and therefore
called memorized psychical resultants or commonly experiences
(Erfahrung; e.g. mental and sensory representations, capacities
for reasoning, mood tendencies with memorization broadly
referring to any retention process).(iii) Composite kinds of phenomena
Three further kinds of phenomena are conceived as
composite—semiotic representations (e.g. language), artificial
outer-appearance modifications (e.g. clothes) and contexts
(e.g. situations), the first two particularly important for
humans. In composites, phenomena of different kind (dis-
tinguished by the three abstract properties) are tightly
interrelated, forming a functional whole fromwhich new prop-
erties and functions not present in their constituents emerge.
These new properties can be explored only if the constituents
are studied in their functional interdependencewithin the com-
posite. A peculiarity is that these composites lack physical
boundaries demarcating them (e.g. cell membranes); instead,
the phenomena involved are often located apart from one
another making their functional interdependence not readily
apparent. Semiotic representations illustrate this.
Semiotic representations (e.g. spoken, written language) are
composites in which psychical phenomena (e.g. meanings,
mental representations) are tightly interrelated with physical
phenomena external to individuals’ bodies (e.g. vocal sounds,
ink, paper) that are used to represent in publicly accessible
ways the meanings and referents to which they refer, forming
a functional whole from which new properties emerge. This
interrelation is so deeply embedded in our everyday thinking
that its composite nature does not become readily apparent
and may sometimes create the illusion meanings are contained
in the spoken andwrittenwords themselves. Butmeanings and
mental representations are internal ‘non-physical’ phenomena,
whereas speech and writing are external physical phenomena
and therefore perceivable for others who can infer from them
themeanings referred. For example, theword ‘bird’ can be com-
posed of visible patterns on paper shaped like ‘BIRD’ or
‘OISEAU’ (French for bird) or the vocalizations or
[wa.zo]. In the composite, these external physical elements
(e.g. graphemes) carry meanings not inherent to them in them-
selves, but that individuals only assign to them.When multiple
individuals mentally represent such assignments in sociallyshared ways, the composite’s physical elements become signs.
Assignments of meaning are generally arbitrary and hence
vary. Nobody can straightforwardly recognize the meaning
of ‘oiseau’ just from the word itself without knowing the
meaning French speakers assign it. Thus, whether or not a par-
ticular physical element constitutes a sign for an individual is
determined by psychical properties inseparable from that indi-
vidual. This has important implications for language-based
research on individuals (§3).
Artificial outer-appearance modifications denote the parts of
natural outer morphology that individuals modify them-
selves (e.g. hairstyle) and the physical objects they attach to
their bodies (e.g. clothing). These modifications are external
and (primarily material) physical. They are temporally
more extended than behaviours but often less extended
than natural outer morphology (e.g. tattoos). Appearance
modifications are often used to convey meanings, and thus
constitute special kinds of semiotic representations. They
are treated separately because their physical attachment to
individuals influences their social perception, which plays
an important role in research on individuals.
Environments are commonly conceived as surroundings
external to and separate from the individual as seen from
the researchers’ perspective (e.g. nature-nurture and person-
situation concepts). But system theories highlight that
individuals of all species, given their particular physical and
psychical abilities, interact only with external elements relevant
to them [17]. Thus, what constitutes an environment for an indi-
vidual cannot be defined independent of it. This subjective
component can but need not be shared by others (i.e. be inter-
subjective). To reduce misunderstandings, the TPS-Paradigm
uses the term context conceived as composites involving at
least one phenomenon inseparable from the individual studied
(a basic one). Contexts can be considered on all levels, involving
both external and internal phenomena. Researchers must
specify which kinds of phenomena are in the focus and which
ones are explored as their context in given studies. Contexts of
special kind are situations.
A situation is defined as ‘the particular constellation of
events (elements) of all kinds of internal and external
phenomena that are present in a given moment and that the
individual can directly perceive, consciously or not’ [5,10].
This comprises not only external but also internal physical
phenomena because the individual’s body is always present
(e.g. hormonal status) as well as all ongoing psychical events4.
These concepts are now applied to explore individual
differences research.(c) Metatheoretical ideas underlying personality
and temperament
(i) Blended concepts
The TPS-Paradigm’s frameworks highlight that basic concepts
of individual differences research, such as personality, tempera-
ment and ‘traits’, commonly refer to various kinds of
phenomena. Personality defined as ‘an individual’s character-
istic patterns of thought, emotion, and behavior, together with
the psychological mechanisms–hidden or not–behind those
patterns’ [18] refers to psyche and behaviour. Allport’s [1]
widely used definition as ‘the dynamic organization within
the individual of those psychophysical systems that determine
his unique adjustments to his environment’ mentions psyche,
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definitions also include outer morphology and appearance [19].
But researchers disagree which kinds of phenomena they
consider as part of personality and which ones as its causes
or consequences. ‘Those characteristics that account for a per-
son’s consistent patterns of feeling, thinking, and behaving’
[20] treats behavioural and psychical patterns as outcomes
of ‘those characteristics’ that are conceived as personality
but left undefined. Allport’s definition, by contrast, treats
psyche, physiology and inner morphology as integral parts
of personality and behaviours as outcomes. The definition
as ‘patterns of thought, emotion, and behaviour’, in turn,
treats behaviours as integral parts of personality—an under-
standing in which studies on ‘behavioural outcomes of
personality’ entail circular explanations.
Temperament commonly denotes biologically based indi-
vidual patterns that occur early in life, are more strongly
genetically influenced, long-termconsistent and linked toneuro-
transmitter, neuropeptide and hormone systems, and that are
therefore differentiated from socially influenced and learned
individual patterns conceived as personality [2]. But there
is nogeneral consensusabout theparticularphenomena involved
in temperament and their concrete differentiation from personal-
ity. Conceptual understanding also varies for many other terms
(e.g. ‘character’, trait, ‘disposition’, ‘individuality’) [3].
Proponents of different concepts all have their points
and rationales. But this diversity in the conceptual under-
standing of the same terms hinders theoretical integration.
Identifying basic ideas underlying common definitions and
concepts, the TPS-Paradigm’s frameworks can help to unravel
commonalities, differences and interrelations.(ii) Core concept: individual-specificity
These frameworks also help scrutinize the common notions
of ‘individual differences’ (differential patterns) and ‘individ-
uals’ characteristic patterns’. Specifically, when are patterns
characteristic enough to warrant their interpretation as per-
sonality or temperament? Not all individual variations are
meaningful for the field. Occurrences of fluctuating phenom-
ena (e.g. behaviours) can change from moment to moment,
entailing considerable within-individual and thus between-
individual variations. But causes, functions, development
and evolution of individual differences can only be explored
if these variabilities are specific to the individual, thus differ
among individuals over some time.
To disentangle individual-specific from moment-to-
moment variations in dynamic and transient phenomena,
measurements must be aggregated over several occasions to
determine individuals’ probabilities for showing particular
phenomena (e.g. heart beats). Differential patterns therein—
in both individuals’ averages and variability (§3aii)—must
be substantially temporally reliable. Thus, temporal patterns
are to be identified in patterns that are defined by a certain temporal
stability in themselves. This is not always well considered.
Animal researchers increasingly interpret any between-
individual variation as reflecting personality even variations
not sufficiently stable, thus variations considered random in
biology until the 1990s [3–5].
The concept of individual-specificity highlights important
distinctions. In itself, it denotes an individual-level concept
(as all personality definitions above) that, however, presupposes
the existence of individualdifferences exploredwithpopulation-level concepts. But taxonomies of a population’s individual
differences (differential research) do not reveal anything about
the single individual, neither about its particular configuration
of scores on various differential dimensions nor about the
intra-organismal organization of this configuration (personality
research). The word personality derives from person, not
from population; therefore, the term ‘personality taxonomy’ is
misleading and ‘personality structure’ is ambiguous.
Inconsistent terminology caused profound misunder-
standings across disciplines. For example, the term ‘animal
personalities’, coined in behavioural ecology, denotes
between-individual variations but not groups of individuals
with similar configurational patterns as theword ‘personalities’
implies [3]. These differentiations are not trivial. As living
organisms, individuals are largely self-organizing. At any one
level of their complex intra-organismal organization, presence
or absence of single elements or single interrelations among
themmay change the composite’s overall transactions, yielding
different phenomena, properties and functionings. Knowledge
about individual differences cannot reveal the intra-organismal
structures and processes from which they emerge. Termi-
nological precision is needed to minimize conceptual
misunderstandings and to enable integrations across disci-
plines, although differentiating personality from ‘personality
differences’ and traits from ‘trait dimensions’ is linguistically
more cumbersome.
(d) Metatheoretical definition: individual-specificity in
all kinds of phenomena
Embracing the basic ideas contained in previous definitions,
the field’s object of research can be meta-theoretically defined
as individual-specificity in ALL kinds of phenomena studied
in individuals, thus in physiology, psyche, behaviours,
morphology, semiotic representations, artificial outer-appear-
ance modifications and contexts. This broad definition avoids
arbitrariness and implicit assumptions in deciding which
kinds of individual-specificity form part of personality or
temperament and which ones do not. Ultimately, what
could justify such a decision given that causes and conse-
quences of personality can only be identified if they, too,
feature individual-specific patterns? It also avoids a-priori
assumptions about which kinds of individual-specificity are
more biologically or more socially influenced to justify their
interpretation as temperament or personality, respectively.
After all, if causal explanations constitute defining criteria
of an object of research, what then could explain the object
thus-defined? Such definitions are inherently circular [10].
But instead of creating an even more abstract construct,
it is broken into sub-constructs of individual-specificity that
each refer to just one kind of phenomenon. Accordingly,
one can distinguish from one another individual-specific
physiology, individual-specific psychical phenomena, indi-
vidual-specific behaviours, individual-specific morphology,
individual-specific artificial outer-appearance modifications,
individual-specific contexts, individual-specific use and
understanding of semiotic representations as well as semiotic
representations about individual-specificity. In their entirety,
all these different kinds of individual-specificity make up an
individual’s uniqueness. The meta-theoretical definition
allows researchers to specify in which particular pheno-
mena they study individual-specificity rather than using the
abstract terms personality or temperament uniformly for
for different kinds of variability
such as individual-specificity in
— compositional structures
individuals’ averages
context specificity 
behaviour specificity,…
— process structures
within-individual variability 
— microgenetic development
— ontogenetic development
explanatory taxonomies 
descriptive taxonomies
for each kind of phenomenon
studied in individuals: 
— basic kinds:
morphology    behaviour
physiology psyche
— composite kinds:
semiotic representations
outer-appearance modifications
contexts (e.g. situations)
integrative taxonomies 
Hourglass-Shape Methodology
Three consecutive steps of analysis:
between-individual
within-individual
between individual
modelling complex interrelations
of compositional and process
structures among the
various kinds of phenomena
Figure 1. Different types of taxonomies are needed to comprehensively explore individual-specificity. In the Hourglass-Shape Methodology, between- and within-
individual analyses are applied complementarily to identify compositional structures of individual-specific and population/species-typical patterns as well as basic
process structures of their functioning and development in individuals. (Online version in colour.)
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ceptibility, require different methods of investigation and
thus cannot be studied all at once.
This differentiation also allows researchers to specify the
phenomena to be explained (explananda) and those explored
as their causes (explanantia) and outcomes in given studies.
For example, researchers may explore how individual-specific
patterns in physiology (e.g. neurotransmitters) influence
individual-specific behaviours (e.g. impulsiveness), or, con-
versely, how individual-specific behaviours (e.g. eating)
may influence individual-specific physiology (e.g. hor-
mones), or—considering complexity—what transactional
feedback processes occur between both (§3e–f). Such ana-
lyses are precluded when causal directions are predefined
(e.g. behaviours as outcomes of personality).3. Taxonomies of individual-specificity:
methodological foundations
Valid taxonomies of individual-specific variations are impor-
tant because they serve as reference models for research and
applied settings. Any biases can therefore compromise findings
and theories in many fields. TPS-Paradigm’s frameworks are
now applied to elaborate the methodological foundations of
taxonomy development.
(a) Types of taxonomic models
(i) Taxonomies for each kind of phenomenon
The various kinds of phenomena explored for individual-
specificity require different methods of investigation. But
different methods, such as those needed to study physiology,
behaviour and semiotic representations, generate different
kinds of data that cannot be analysed jointly for taxonomic
structures. Such blended analyses also impede explorations
of their complex causal and functional interrelations
(§2c–d). Thus, contrary to common assumptions, one single
taxonomy that best describes (and even explains) individ-
ual-specificity in all kinds of phenomena cannot bedeveloped with one single methodological approach and
one single method. Instead, taxonomic models first have to
be developed for each kind of phenomenon separately and
using phenomenon-specific methodologies and methods,
thus taxonomies for each sub-construct of individual-
specificity (e.g. taxonomy of individual-specific physiology,
taxonomy of individual-specific behaviours, taxonomy of
semiotic representations about individual-specificity).
These different phenotypical taxonomies are first steps to
describe the complex diversity of individual-specificity in
parsimonious ways. They are then used, in subsequent
steps, to explore the interrelations among individual-specific
patterns in different kinds of phenomena that are modelled
in integrative and explanatory taxonomies (§3aiii, figure 1).
Parsimonious overarching models can be developed only
stepwise and by capitalizing on different fields’ expertise
and efforts.
This insight may puzzle many psychologists who, so far,
have aimed to develop a ‘universal taxonomy’ using basically
just one method—assessments. Human language seemed to
make this feasible because it contains a rich vocabulary
for socio-culturally important individual-specific variations.
These person-descriptors and the ability of language to
denote phenomena abstracted from their perceivable properties
and from the contexts in which they occur (decontextualized),
promoted the large-scale application of assessment methods.
Themost popular taxonomies of human individual differences,
even models based on biological theories (e.g. [21,22]), were so
far developed with assessments.
The conceptual blending of various kinds of phenomena in
common concepts of personality and temperament, enabled
through linguistic abstraction, resulted in highly interpretive
conglomerates of ideas about individual-specificity—in every-
day life and in science. Thus, language seemed to enable
scientists to meet the principle of parsimony in highly efficient
ways. But words are often uncritically assumed to correspond
to real entities. Thismay be possible for physical events directly
perceptible without reflection but not for abstract ideas [23].
Individual-specificity is an abstract concept involving the
joint consideration of temporal, differential and (in fluctuating
rstb.royalsocietypublishing.org
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directly perceived at any given moment.
Assessments are retrospective, evaluative and memory-
based, and therefore capture people’s ideas, beliefs and
knowledge, thus their semiotic representations about
individual-specificity. But assessments cannot capture any
other kind of phenomenon, neither transient phenomena
perceivable in others (e.g. behaviours) or in oneself (e.g. experi-
encings) nor any phenomenon not directly perceivable in
anyone in everyday life (e.g. physiology; [9,24]). This means
that people’s everyday ideas about individual-specificity
underlie assessment-derived models, rather than any biologi-
cal individual differences as often assumed. Taxonomies of
individual-specificity in physical, behavioural and psychical
phenomena, often conceived as personality, are still largely
missing [2,4,9,25]..B
373:20170171(ii) Taxonomies for compositional structures and process
structures
Decontextualization enabled by language shifts researchers’
and raters’ focus away from the facts that, in humans and
other species, individuals behave differently in different nom-
inal settings and that thesewithin-individual variabilities often
differ among individuals in temporally reliableways. This indi-
vidual-specific context/situation specificity (context-dependence)
entails that, on the sample level, cross-situational consistency
is often only moderate [3,26]. Individual-specificity also
occurs in the specific behaviours of similar function andmean-
ing that individuals show in given contexts (e.g. different
anxiety-related behaviours); this individual-specific behaviour
specificity entails that internal consistencies are often only
low [27–29].
The abstracting abilities of language shift the focus of
assessment studies towards individuals’ averages, prompting
researchers and raters to conceive processes as entities—
such as those labelled as traits, temperament or personality
[4,30]. Averages allow researchers to explore basic compo-
sitional structures of individual differences in populations
(differential taxonomies) and of single individuals’ specific
constellations of deviations from their population’s averages
(personality profiles). But averages do not reveal how the
identified components emerge, function and develop
together in the individual. This requires analyses of within-
individual variability over shorter and longer periods of
time to identify process structures (figure 1).
In transient and dynamic phenomena, within-individual
variations reflect these phenomena’s processual nature rather
than just random variation and measurement error [31].
Measurements may therefore not show high temporal and
internal reliability as required for standardized assessments
[28,32]. Individual-specificity emerges in within-individual
variability indicating microgenetic processes of development. It
also emerges in the stability of individual-specific variations
over longer periods of time, indicating individual-specific
trajectories of ontogenetic development [33]. These different
kinds of individual-specific variability provide important
insights into the causes, functions and development of
individual-specific phenomena [4,34,35].
Taxonomizing process structures requires models and
methods other than those used for taxonomizing compositional
structures (§3e). The popular Five Factor Model of human per-
sonality merely taxonomizes individual differences; it isdifferent from Five Factor Theory describing intra-individual
processes that are assumed to contribute to their emergence
[36], yet without modelling such processes empirically.(iii) Integrative taxonomies and explanatory models developed
using the Hourglass-Shape Methodology
In subsequent steps, taxonomies modelling compositional
structures and process structures in the various kinds of
phenomena are used to empirically explore their complex
interrelations that are modelled in integrative taxonomies.
Phenomenon-specific models will allow to unravel how accu-
rately taxonomies derived from everyday language actually
represent individual-specificity in kinds of phenomena obser-
vable (e.g. behaviour, outer morphology) and non-observable
in others (e.g. psyche, physiology), the ways in which lexical
models may reflect sociocultural perceptions, interpretations
and appraisals; and how individual-specificity in the differ-
ent kinds of phenomena may actually vary within and
among sociolinguistic communities [4,7,37,38].
Such integrative models are, for a start, only phenotypical
descriptions, just as the phenomenon-specific models from
which they are derived (figure 1). Moreover, and importantly,
individuals function and develop not primarily on the basis
of what differentiates them from others but on the basis
of structures and processes that are highly similar in all
individuals (normative) and that are thus population- or species-
typical. This requires models describing interrelations among
both individual-specific and population-/species-typical
phenomena [7,9].
To explain processes of microgenesis (Aktualgenese5) and
ontogenesis, researchers must consider the complex pathways
of causation emerging from the dynamic and nonlinear multi-
level transactions occurring in living organisms. The common
nomothetic strategy to dissect the complexity of individual-
specific phenomena into a few individual difference constructs
therefore cannot explain how any thus-dissected elements
function and develop together in each individual [1,40].
Inter-individual differences cannot explain intra-individual
organization. Recognizing this, idiographic approaches
focus on the single individual [39]. But idiographic single
case studies cannot disentangle individual-specific from
population-/species-typical patterns [7].
This nomothetic-idiographic problem is solved in the
TPS-Paradigm by implementing the principle of epistemologi-
cal complementarity in the Hourglass-ShapeMethodology [7].
It systematically combines between-individual and within-
individual methodologies in three consecutive steps of
exploration, shifting the focus of analysis stepwise from
many to single and then again to many individuals (there-
fore its name; figure 1). In Step 1, between-individual
analyses identify compositional structures of individual-specific
and population-/species-typical patterns in given kinds of
phenomena in given populations. In Step 2, within-individual
analyses explore the processes by which (selected sets of) indi-
vidual-specific and population-/species-typical structures
(identified in step 1) function and develop together in single
individuals, microgenetically and ontogenetically. In Step 3,
between-individual analyses explore the within-individual
processes (identified in step 2) for commonalities and differ-
ences across many individuals to identify basic process
structures of functioning and development that are similar or
different for particular groups of individuals (figure 1). These
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mutually exclusive but all needed for a comprehensive under-
standing of individuals and that are therefore complementary
to one another. Hence, nomothetic and idiographic
approaches, although apparently incompatible, are both essen-
tial for exploring individuals and must be purposefully
combined with one another in complementary orderly steps.
The Hourglass-Shape Methodology outlines a transdisci-
plinary research agenda that requires the joint efforts of
multiple research programmes and disciplines. Such method-
ologies are already applied in many biological and medical
fields that have developed not one general model of human
biology or physical health comprising a few dimensions
assumed to describe and even explain individual functioning
and development. Instead, these fields established a multitude
of models about specific structures and processes in specific
kinds of phenomena in relevant groups of individuals.
Researchers in psycho-neuro-immunology have modelled
microgenetic and ontogenetic processes in the interactions
among the psychical, the nervous and the immune systems.
Such integrative and explanatorymodels provided newknowl-
edge about the molecular mechanisms mediating the still
largely unknown body–mind interrelations and opened new
perspectives for unravelling mechanisms underlying healthy
and pathologic functioning and development [41].
(b) Comprehensiveness and representativeness
Taxonomizing the complexity of individual-specific vari-
ations in the different kinds of phenomena is challenging.
The enormous diversity requires taxonomists to decide
which phenomena to study (selection approaches) and how to
identify variations that are individual-specific and those
that are ‘most important’ (reduction approaches). Any differ-
ences in these decisions can change the taxonomies derived,
thus compromising findings and comparisons among
populations (e.g. cultures or species). Therefore, systematic
approaches are needed.
To elaborate the methodological foundations of taxonomy
development, two concepts are introduced here. Comprehen-
siveness denotes that a taxonomic model for a given kind of
phenomenon (e.g. behaviour) includes the full range of
phenomena in which individual-specific variations occur in
the study population (e.g. all relevant behavioural domains).
Representativeness denotes that the individual-specific vari-
ations included in a model within each domain reasonably
reflect the study population’s diversity. For example, includ-
ing only variables that produce norm-distributed data creates
models that may not adequately represent the actual distri-
bution patterns occurring in given phenomena (e.g. skewed
distributions of aggressive behaviours). Comprehensiveness
is influenced by both selection and reduction approaches;
representativeness only by reduction approaches.
(c) Selection approaches
Selection approaches are all operations and practices taxono-
mists use to decide about which specific phenomena to study
(e.g. which behaviours), thus what is included in model
development. Comprehensive taxonomization requires
approaches enabling systematic selections from the universe
of all phenomena in which individual-specific variations
occur in given kinds of phenomena in given populations.
This universe can be determined in physical phenomena(depending on the state of knowledge) because their spatial
extension allows elements to be to demarcated (e.g. single be-
havioural acts, single cells). But in psychical phenomena,
the universe of phenomena cannot be determined because
their ‘non-physical’ properties do not allow elements to be
demarcated (e.g. single thoughts, single emotions). This
also concerns composites involving psychical phenomena,
such as semiotic representations. The physical parts of
language allow separate ‘words’ to be clearly demarcated,
but this is not possible for the meanings assigned to them.
Meanings are fluid and vary across regions and time; but
these variations may not be reflected in the spelling, pronun-
ciation and composition of words. This imposes challenges to
all language-based approaches (§3ciii).
Various selection approaches are used. They can be classi-
fied by their underlying selection principles and the kinds of
phenomena they allow to select. Two previous schemes to clas-
sify selection approaches from primate personality research
[3,37,38,42] and human personality psychology [6] are now
integrated and refined into a basic scheme covering approa-
ches used in various disciplines for studying humans and
other species. Three basic principles can be distinguished,
content-based, strategy-based and partial strategy-based.(i) Content-based selection principles
Approaches in which the phenomena to be studied for indi-
vidual-specific variations are selected on the basis of their
particular qualities (content domains) rely on content-based
principles (figure 2). Such principles underlie nomination
approaches, in which experts nominate individual-specific
variations they deem important for a population (e.g. insiders
of indigenous communities in cross-cultural psychology or
keepers in animal research).
In cumulative-gain-in-knowledge approaches, researchers
aim to develop comprehensive models by selecting con-
structs already established for the study population, thus
capitalizing on findings derived from other approaches. In
psychology, the Five Factor Model was developed by compil-
ing the long-studied constructs Neuroticism and Extraversion
first with Openness to Experience and later with Agreeable-
ness and Conscientiousness6 [43] after these constructs have
become established in the Big-Five Model ([44]) through
lexical approaches (§3ciii).
In top-down (etic7) approaches, researchers select constructs
originally developed for other populations. For example, the
Five Factor Model was applied to sociolinguistic commu-
nities other than those for which it was developed [6,45]
and even to other species [38,46,47].
In theory-driven approaches, researchers use specific theories
to deduce (and explain) the occurrence of particular individ-
ual-specific variants in given populations. Freud used his
topographic model of mind and his theory of psychosexual
development to derive (and explain) the existence of particular
individual-specific types. Galen used his theory of physiologi-
cal systems to deduce four temperament types [2]. Theories
about adaptive problems encountered by a species are used
to deduce particular individual differences occurring in adap-
tation to them (e.g. [48]).
In mixed approaches, researchers combine elements of
different selection approaches, such as by combining estab-
lished constructs with nominations or top-down approaches
(e.g. [49]).
content-based
nomination approaches
cumulative gain-in knowledge
approaches
top-down (etic) approaches
theory-driven approaches
mixed approaches
partial strategy-based
to taxonomize individual-specificity in psychical phenomena indirectly using
strategy-based taxonomizations of physical phenomena as anchor points:
physical elements of semiotic representations: lexical approaches
behaviours: BRxBS-approach
non-statistical
statistical redundancy-based
statistical context-based
statistical configuration-based
statistical function-based
degrees of differential variability
levels of temporal reliability 
time spans
criteria depend on the study phenomena
and the life-time of the study species
selection principles
reduction principlesidentifying individual specificity
strategy-based
physical system approaches
— behavioural
behavioural repertoire × behavioural
situations approach (BRxBS-approach)
— morphological 
e.g. ecto-phenotype approaches
— physiological 
e.g. endo-phenotype approaches
Figure 2. Selection and reduction approaches to taxonomize individual-specificity in various kinds of phenomena can be classified by their underlying rationales and
principles. (Online version in colour.)
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ations are salient to people, theoretically plausible or already
described for given populations requires researchers to focus
on the qualities (content domains) of these variations. This
means, individual-specific variations have to be specified before
taxonomists can even begin to identify and taxonomize such vari-
ations in their study population. As individual-specificity
cannot be directly perceived at any given moment, taxono-
mists (and nominators) necessarily rely on their pertinent
ideas and (implicit) beliefs. But as the universe of ideas and
knowledge from which to sample cannot be determined,
approaches enabling comprehensive selections cannot be
devised. This renders content-based selection principles
susceptible to biases that researchers (and their informants)
may (unintentionally) introduce. The focus on contents also
prompts them to select highly interpretive conglomerates of
ideas about individual-specificity, in which phenomena of
different kind are conceptually blended although they differ
in perceptibility by humans and thus require different methods
of investigation. These factors limit the comprehensiveness
of taxonomizations.
(ii) Strategy-based selection principles
Strategy-based principles, by contrast, provide explicitly
formulated frameworks and strategies on which resear-
chers can base their selections without already specifying any
particular ones and thus without compelling researchers to
focus on the qualities of the individual-specific variants to
be studied. This eliminates the necessity to rely unintention-
ally on preconceived ideas, thus reducing risks for biases.
Therefore, strategy-based principles enable comprehensive
selections. However, such principles can be formulated only
for physical phenomena because their spatial properties
allow researchers to determine the universe of phenomena
from which to sample. Pertinent approaches are therefore
called physical system approaches (previously called ‘manifest
system approaches’ [4] and ‘bottom-up approaches’ [3,37]).
Various kinds of physical system approaches exist that are
each targeted at one kind of phenomenon (figure 2).A behavioural physical system approach is the Behavioural
Repertoire  Behavioural Situations Approach8 (BRxBS-
Approach; [3,4,6,37,38] developed within the TPS-Paradigm
to comprehensively taxonomize individual-specific behaviours
in human and nonhuman populations. It specifies a multi-step
procedure in which the behaviours to be studied for individ-
ual-specificity are selected systematically from the known
universe of a species’ behaviours (its behavioural repertoire)
as described in the existing ethological and behaviour-scientific
literature that is unconcerned with individual differences
and personality.
The approach therefore starts with a systematic review of
this literature in which researchers compile in a database all
behaviours and the situations in which they are reported to
occur in each publication. Then this compilation is reorgan-
ized and sorted by behaviours, grouping more specific ones
(e.g. slap, bite) into the more abstract categories used in
the literature (e.g. social aggression) and eliminating redun-
dancies across studies. By hypothesizing occurrence of
individual-specific variations in each behavioural category,
working constructs of individual-specificity are generated (e.g.
aggressiveness to conspecifics). Their meaning and content
are defined by the specific behaviours and situations from
which they were derived and that can be used to select
variables for empirical studies.
The working constructs are used to empirically explore
if in the given population or species individual-specific
variations do in fact occur that are then taxonomized using
various reduction approaches (§3e). By building on the
established knowledge base about a species’ behavioural
repertoire rather than on previous descriptions of individual
variations or on researchers’ or nominators’ pertinent ideas,
the BRxBS-Approach enables comprehensive taxonomizations,
which are needed for valid comparisons. Applications in var-
ious primate species yielded evidence for individual-specific
variations across these species’ behavioural repertoires,
among them variations not previously identified with other
approaches (e.g. with top-down approaches from the Five
Factor Model [27,28,32,42]).
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to comprehensively taxonomize individual-specificity in
physiology and morphology. Examples are endo-phenotype
approaches in molecular psychiatry [50], approaches taxono-
mizing individual-specific brain morphology [51], and
ecto-phenotype approaches taxonomizing individuals’ face
or body morphology [52,53].
(iii) Partial strategy-based selection principles
Challenges arise for taxonomizing individual-specificity in
psychical phenomena because their indeterminable universes
preclude comprehensive selection approaches. Moreover,
psychical phenomena are imperceptible for others and can
be explored only indirectly through externalizations in
language and behaviour, but straightforward inferences
cannot be made [10,54]. A third selection principle therefore
uses strategy-based taxonomizations of physical phenomena
as anchor points to taxonomize individual-specificity in psychi-
cal phenomena indirectly. This does not allow psychical
phenomena in themselves to be selected comprehensively,
but provides a systematic strategy for exploring individual-
specific variations without compelling researchers to focus
on specific ones. Such selection principles are therefore
called partial strategy based (figure 2).
Lexical approaches are based on partial strategy-based
selection principles. They build on the hypothesis that
important individual differences are encoded in everyday
language [55]. Accordingly, the lexica constitute the universe
of elements from which to sample without suggesting any
particular ones. In the 1930s, Allport and Odbert [56] filtered
17 953 person-descriptors from the English dictionary. This
comprehensive selection formed the basis for various lexical
models (e.g. Big-Five Model, Hexaco-Model, Big Seven
Model [6,44]). Lexical approaches enable systematic but
not comprehensive approaches to taxonomize individual-
specificity in psychical phenomena because word meanings
vary and not all experiencings can be verbalized.
Partial strategy-based selection principles can also be
implemented using comprehensive behavioural taxonomies.
For example, BRxBS-Approach-derived taxonomies were
used to systematically explore observers’ beliefs about indi-
vidual-specific behaviours [24,32,42,46]. Taxonomies of
individual-specific artificial outer-appearance modifications and
contexts can be developed analogously by first taxonomizing
comprehensively the physical components involved that
are then used to systematically explore the meanings and
functions they have for individuals. Findings from various
partial strategy-based approaches involving different kinds
of physical phenomena (e.g. lexical and behavioural) can
then be integrated into overarching models of individual-
specificity in psychical phenomena (within the limitations
of their only indirect explorability).
After selecting the specific phenomena to study, taxono-
mists must define how to identify individual-specificity
in them.
(d) Identifying individual-specificity
Individual-specificity implies temporal and differential
patterns that cannot be directly perceived at any given
moment. Still, raters are asked to judge individual-specificity
on questionnaire scales. A single rating score can reflect differ-
ential, temporal and even individual-specific patterns in itselfbecause language and assessments reflect sociocultural beliefs
and ideas people have about individual-specificity in various
kinds of phenomena (e.g. behaviours, morphology). But
assessments cannot capture these latter in themselves. In tran-
sient phenomena (e.g. behaviours, physiology), any single
recording can capture only occurrences or non-occurrences
of events (e.g. heart beats) and their physical intensity (e.g.
electric potentials). But to generate data about individuals
(e.g. heart rate), these raw data must first be aggregated
within each individual over time before they can be explored
for individual-specific patterns [9,28].
Given this, researchers must decide and explicitly define
what empirical degrees of differential variability and what
empirical levels of temporal reliability are needed to warrant
interpretation as individual-specificity (figure 2). This has not
yet been formally done. These fundamental questions do not
arise in assessment research because every raw datum
already implies assumptions of temporality of the phenom-
ena described, which is a property of raters’ beliefs, not of
the individual-specific phenomena described.
So far, taxonomic research in humans has strongly relied
on assessments. Degrees of differential variability and levels
of stability of individual differences in everyday behaviour,
many phenomena of physiology, appearance modifications,
contexts and even people’s use of semiotic representa-
tions are therefore not well known. Researchers must
specify criteria, considering that these depend on the studied
phenomena’ properties (figure 2).
(i) Degrees of differential variability
In most kinds of phenomena, differential variability is
continuous. Researchers must define what degree of between-
individual variability is necessary to warrant interpretations
as individual-specific. What could be a legitimate basis for
defining cut-off points for minimum degrees of differential
variation? Should they be higher in phenomena individuals
can (partially) control themselves (e.g. behaviours) than in
phenomena they cannot control (e.g. morphology)? Should
degrees of differential variability in temporally extended
phenomena (e.g. morphology) be higher or lower than in
momentary and fluctuating phenomena? Should other cri-
teria be considered, for example, effects that differential
variability may have on outcomes in individuals’ external
surroundings or in relations to them? Or is just any degree
of differential variability meaningful as long as it is
sufficiently stable?
(ii) Levels of temporal reliability and time spans
Because individual-specificity implies temporal patterns
in itself, researchers must distinguish two kinds of tempo-
ral analyses. Temporal reliability (not to be confused with
measurement accuracy) refers to the primary identification
of differential patterns as individual-specific. Temporal stab-
ility, by contrast, explores individual-specific patterns across
time periods longer than those in which they were first deter-
mined (through temporal reliability), such as to explore
patterns of ontogenetic development (e.g. life trajectories).
Assessments cannot make the necessary distinction between
reliability and stability because they rely on rater-determined
implicit assumptions about temporal extensions.
Levels of temporal extension vary continuously. But how
much temporal reliability is needed to warrant interpretation
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ones? Cut-off criteria must consider the temporal properties
of the phenomena studied. Differential patterns are necess-
arily more temporally reliable in phenomena that are
temporally more extended (e.g. morphology, semiotic rep-
resentations) than in those that are dynamic and transient
(e.g. behaviours; [9,24]). Therefore, researchers may want to
set lower cut-off criteria for these latter.
Temporal reliability estimates also depend on the level of
aggregation across measurement occasions and variables as
well as on the time spans considered. In humans, researchers
often study temporal reliability over four to six weeks. But
animal researchers are confronted with diverse lifespans ran-
ging from days and weeks (e.g. mayflies, bees) up to several
centuries (e.g. whales). Researchers have yet to define the
time spans in relation to species’ lifespans needed to deter-
mine whether or not individual-specificity occurs. Special
considerations may also be needed for different ontogenetic
stages to account for developmental changes that are,
during some periods, relatively accelerated (e.g. infancy, ado-
lescence) and decelerated (e.g. adulthood). Thus, criteria to
identify individual-specificity may vary also within lifespans.
When individual-specific variations are identified, taxo-
nomists must decide how to categorize and reduce them to
the ‘most important’ ones.
(e) Reduction approaches
Reduction approaches are all operations and practices
taxonomists apply to identify basic structures of individual-
specific variations by summarizing datasets, large amounts
of selected raw materials or variables (e.g. word lists) in par-
simonious ways. Reduction approaches determine what
is retained during taxonomy development and how basic
structures are identified and modelled. Therefore, they influ-
ence both comprehensiveness and representativeness of
the models derived. Approaches can be classified by their
underlying reduction principles (figure 2).
(i) Non-statistical reduction principles
To reduce the selected materials to sizes manageable for data
collection, various non-statistical principles are used. Allport
and Odbert [56], sorted their comprehensive 17 953-word list
into four major categories (e.g. lasting personal traits, tempor-
ary states), noting that ‘much depends upon the linguistic
habits of each individual judge’ and that judges were ‘often
forced to choose arbitrarily between several possible shades
of meaning’ (p. 35). This judgement-based categorization
formed the basis for numerous taxonomies (e.g. Big-Five
Model) that were derivedwith further non-statistical reduction
methods, such as semantic similarity judgements or exclusion
of specific content-domains (e.g. attitudes, sexuality-related
attributes). Because these reductions are based on content-
related decisions, it is not astonishing that taxonomies derived
from the same word lists are ‘remarkably different’ in both
general structure and specific details [55]. These differences
reflect the taxonomists’ different implicit and explicit concepts
of personality that guided their decisions.
Other non-statistical reduction approaches involve selec-
tions of person-descriptors from just every fifth or tenth
lexicon page or of only adjectives, nouns or verbs. Such
reductions may be less prone to researcher-introduced biases,
but are not representative of the diversity of meanings peopleencode in words. These biases are rarely considered because
they occur before data generation. (Selection, reduction and
identification of individual-specificity are sometimes inter-
mingled.) But non-statistical reduction decisions restrict what
can be studied at all and thus the comprehensiveness of the
models derived.
(ii) Statistical redundancy-based reduction principles
Statistical methods to analyse structures in datasets are
numerous (e.g. factor analysis). But statistics work without
knowledge of the meaning behind the variables. Researchers
must decide if the analytical procedures performed on the
data are appropriate for the studied phenomena’s properties
encoded in the data.
Many popular taxonomies were derived from assessments
because language seems to enable efficient and flexible
explorations of a wide range of phenomena. Questionnaire
developers create item statements describing similar attri-
butes of individuals (and their opposites) to obtain
homogeneous sets of (balanced keyed) items. The items are
often presented in randomized order, thereby further decon-
textualizing the attributes described. In iterative processes of
item selection and analysis, psychometricians retain only
items that reliably produce data with particular distribution
patterns (e.g. normal distribution) and ‘desirable’ statistical
structures (e.g. internally consistent responses to similar
items). In factor analyses, psychometricians select items pro-
ducing high loadings on just one factor and eliminate items
producing loadings on multiple factors because this facilitates
interpretation. Researchers’ decisions about the number and
diversity of selected variables and the sighted level of data
reduction determine how many factors are created.
Consequently, co-variations in assessments reflect simi-
larities—thus redundancies—in the meanings respondents
construct for the items statements (e.g. regarding their
semantic similarity [25] or valence [32]). But by selecting only
items producing data that match assumptions of statistical
theories and discarding all items that do not, psychometricians
radically match the data generation to statistical theories rather
than to the properties of the actual phenomena under
study. This challenges assumptions on the representativeness
of many personality taxonomies. In fact, adjectives of popular
questionnaires are used with disparate frequencies in online
media [57].
In language, redundancies can be generated at low costs;
therefore, variables can be created ad libitum. But in biologi-
cal systems (e.g. behaviour, physiology), redundancies are
rare probably due to ecological and evolutionary constraints
[4]. Moreover, in dynamic and transient phenomena, individ-
ual-specific patterns reach degrees of complexity in which
simple regular structures that could explain much of the
variability observed cannot be found [7]. Intercorrelations
among behavioural variables are therefore much less consist-
ent than those among carefully selected assessment items [32]
so that statistically extracted factors or principal components
often account for only low to moderate percentages of the
data variance [58].(iii) Statistical context-based reduction principles
To statistically explore structures of complex phenomena as
they occur in the individuals under study, context-based
reduction principles are needed. Lexicometric analyses
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test-theoretically desired outcomes but of their empirical co-
occurrences in textual data (e.g. conversations, writings),
enabling inferences to word meaning and belief structures
[59]. It is surprising that lexical researchers have obviously
not yet textually explored the dictionary definitions of widely
assessed person-descriptors [6]. Context-based statistical ana-
lyses are also applicable to explore other kinds of phenomena
encoded in textual data (e.g. behaviours [6])..org
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Challenges occur in taxonomizations of (non-semiotic)
behaviours because redundancies are rare and individual-
specificity emerges also on fine-grained levels. In humans, for
example, gaze aversion, hesitant speaking, long pauses in
speech and restricted gestures all indicate social inhibition. In
chimpanzees; vocalizing, rocking, scratching and pacing all
indicate arousal. But which of these functionally related
behaviours an individual frequently shows can be individual-
specific so that their co-variations are oftenonly low tomoderate
[28,29,42]. Statistical analysis of such patterns (types) requires
configuration-based reduction principles, as implemented in
configural frequency analysis [60] and Q-factor analysis.(v) Statistical function-based reduction principles
To taxonomize individual-specific structures in broad ranges
of behaviours on higher levels of abstraction, the BRxBS-
Approach comprises a two-step reduction principle that
capitalizes on both behaviour-scientific knowledge and stat-
istical methods. First, to make behaviours of different type
(e.g. frequencies, durations) comparable regarding the indi-
vidual differences they reflect, all variables are differentially
standardized (across individuals). Standardized variables
encoding behaviours known to have similar functions and
meaning (e.g. all behaviours indicating arousal) are then
aggregated into functionally defined composite measures of
individual-specificity as defined by the BRxBS-Approach-
generated constructs (e.g. Arousability) and regardless of
possible low internal and cross-situational consistencies.
Aggregation can occur on contextualized and decontextualized
levels (i.e. within and across situations). Then, the composite
construct measures thus-derived, rather than the raw data,
are statistically reduced using context-based or redundancy-
based principles (see [24,32] for examples).
This function-based reduction principle corresponds to
people’s intuitive categorizations of behaviours, which are
largely based on the behaviours’ functionality and meaning
rather than their observable physical similarity or frequency of
occurrence. For example, behaviours commonly considered
most indicative for given individual-specificity constructs
(e.g. contact aggression for aggressiveness) may occur least
homogeneously with other behaviours of similar function and
meaning (e.g. associations between contact and non-contact
aggression are often low [24,32]). But in contrast to intuitions,
these categorizations are made explicit. This enables evidence-
based approaches to explore people’s perceptions of individuals
and their intuitive impression formation. Such approaches
revealed that assessments reflect numerous attribution biases
probably derived from stereotypical beliefs about specific beha-
viours and the valence and salience particular behaviours have
for particular sociocultural communities [24,32].( f ) Principles for explanatory modelling
Reduction principles are aimed at parsimoniously summar-
izing phenotypical structures of phenomena that, given the
complexity of living organisms, may emerge, change and
disappear again. Linear methods of analysis underlying
the analyses commonly used in the field are therefore
inadequate. Explanatory reduction principles are required
that allow researchers to explore the complex feedback pro-
cesses taking place within and among the various kinds of
phenomena and to simulate the trajectories of microgenetic
and ontogenetic development resulting from them. Suitable
methods were developed in complexity research in various
fields, such as dynamic systems modelling, time-series
analyses and network modelling [2,61,62].4. Conclusion
The common idea one big model of personality or tempera-
ment could describe and even explain inter-individual
differences and intra-individual functioning is incompatible
with the complexity of living individuals. Pursuit of this
idea, probably promoted by the abstracting abilities of
human language, has absorbed large-scale efforts over the
last century. Language-based methods, like the questionnaire
assessments popular in psychology, can capture only the
socioculturally informed ideas people have about individual-
specificity in various psycho-bio-socio-ecological systems but
not these latter in themselves.
Multiple phenomenon-specific models and research
methods are needed to phenotypically taxonomize individ-
ual-specific variations occurring in structures and processes
of different kinds of phenomena. Their causal and functional
interrelations and ontogenetic development are then explored
and modelled in integrative and explanatory taxonomies.
Contrary to common practice, such taxonomies must involve
both differential and normative patterns because individuals
largely function on the basis of mechanisms and functions
common to all individuals of a species rather than solely on
the basis of differences among them.
Developing such models requires the expertise of many
fields and their joint efforts across disciplinary boundaries,
and therefore is an inherently transdisciplinary endeavour.
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1This notion differs from various philosophical definitions (e.g.
Kant’s).
2This differentiation is often made only implicitly, such as in the
vague notions of ‘outer’ versus ‘inner’ behaviours.
3Psychical denotes the phenomena of the psyche themselves, psycho-
logical the pertinent body of knowledge (Greek -logi´a, -logia).
4Behavioural and psychical relevance of particular situations are
further explored and differentiated in the concepts of behavioural
situations and psychically relevant situations [8,10].
5The German term Aktualgenese (from Latin actualis for operative, in
action), coined by Gestalt psychologists for perceptual processes,
refers more explicitly to the time-bound properties of the phenomena
under study than the corresponding English term micro-genesis, which
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of continuous developmental processes of phenomena [24,32].
6The name of the pertinent questionnaire, NEO-Five Factor
Inventory, reflects these origins [43].
7The terms ‘etic’ and ‘emic’ originally denoted the study of
language ‘as from outside’ and ‘inside of a particular system’,
respectively [63]. Cross-cultural, personality and comparative
psychologists adapted this terminology to specify the generation ofconstructs and indicators for comparative analyses. In this field,
‘emic’ denotes bottom-up approaches, here categorised as
physical system approaches, but also nomination approaches
relying on indigenous informants [6]. Given these heterogeneous
meanings, the term ‘emic’ is not used in the present classification
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